The 2026 Formula 1 season approaches the Monaco weekend carrying the weight of a political tangle that is anything but easy to unravel: the revision of the power units for 2027. The issue has now become a real regulatory deadlock. On one side there is the FIA’s desire to correct a formula that continues to leave drivers unconvinced; on the other, there are manufacturers who fear having to revisit projects that have already been set, with costs, technical risks and sporting consequences that are difficult to calculate, as well as the doubt of facing yet another intervention that appears to move in the direction of one team.
The starting point is well known: the 2026 cars have already required several adjustments, but the 50:50 split between internal combustion and electric power chosen for this regulatory cycle remains at the centre of criticism. Drivers complain about an unnatural management of energy, with lift and coast phases and clipping affecting both driving and the quality of the show. This is why the FIA has tried to push for a deeper change for 2027: significantly increasing the fuel flow, giving more power back to the turbo V6, while reducing the electric component at the same time.
In theory, it is a simple solution: more fuel, more horsepower from the combustion engine, less dependence on the electric side. In practice, such a change risks opening up a huge development front. The current engines were designed around precise parameters. Significantly increasing the fuel flow does not simply mean “turning a knob”: it could mean revisiting reliability, architecture, combustion, cooling and consumption. And if consumption increases, larger fuel tanks may be needed. If larger tanks are needed, the chassis could also have to be reconsidered.
This is where the stalemate begins. The manufacturers are not all starting from the same position. Those who believe they already have a competitive power unit, such as Mercedes, see the change as a possible opportunity to consolidate or extend their advantage. Those who still have ground to recover, such as Ferrari, Audi and Honda, fear having to spread resources across too many directions at once: fixing the 2026 unit, adapting it for 2027 and preparing the next project.
Ferrari, officially, has put the issue of additional costs on the table. Even with a possible extra opening in the budget cap for engine manufacturers, the intervention would have a concrete impact. It would not only be about investment in the power unit, because such a deep change would also end up involving the chassis department. But Maranello’s real concern seems more strategic than financial.
Ferrari fears that a broad revision of the rules would end up favouring Mercedes and Red Bull. The reasoning is clear: if those two projects are already considered technical benchmarks, an additional development phase could allow them to work more calmly on 2027, without the same urgency to correct structural problems. Maranello, on the other hand, would risk having to manage two parallel programmes: on one side the need to optimise the current power unit, on the other the obligation to adapt to a far from trivial regulatory change.
The issue, therefore, is not simply “Ferrari against change”. It is a much more rational position: if the regulations are heavily modified when the technical season is already underway, those starting from a stronger base can turn the intervention into a competitive advantage. Those who need to recover, instead, risk losing precious time, dyno hours and engineering resources on an intermediate project, rather than focusing on the long-term trajectory.
The compromise currently on the table moves precisely in this direction: a more limited increase in fuel flow, in the region of five percent, enough to reduce the effects that drivers dislike most without imposing a deep reconstruction of engines and chassis. It would be a softer correction, capable of making lift and coast and clipping less invasive, while avoiding turning 2027 into a new technical mini-reset.
Making the compromise more digestible is also the aerodynamic chapter. For 2027, a reduction in downforce is already planned, with interventions on the rear wing and floor. Less downforce also means less drag and therefore lower energy demands. In this framework, a small increase in available fuel and a reduction in resistance could produce a more credible balance without forcing manufacturers to redesign everything.
The problem is that time is running out. The window to approve the changes with the necessary majority is close to closing, and Formula 1 wants to avoid the issue continuing to drag on in the paddock, fuelling the idea of a regulation born fragile and corrected on the run, something that, truth be told, already seems more than established. This is why Monaco could become the place for mediation: not by chance, but because a political solution is needed even before a technical one.
The FIA also has an important lever: the ADUO procedures, the mechanism that allows engine manufacturers who are further behind to obtain additional margins to recover. Ferrari, Honda and Audi have an interest in maintaining a constructive relationship with the Federation, because it will be the FIA itself that determines how large their deficit is and how much freedom they can have to close it. In such a context, nobody really wants to be seen as responsible for the stalemate.
Ferrari, however, cannot afford to accept a change merely for image reasons. After years in which every regulatory window has been decisive in building or losing competitiveness, Maranello knows that the wrong compromise can weigh more than a bad race, consolidating the idea of a Scuderia now weak compared to the English teams. Costs are the official explanation, but behind that there is a deeper assessment: preventing 2027 from becoming favourable ground for those already ahead, forcing Ferrari to chase on several fronts at the same time.
The most likely solution therefore remains a middle way: less ambitious than the FIA’s initial proposal, but concrete enough to correct at least part of the flaws that have emerged. A technical compromise to get out of a political dead end. And, above all, a way to prevent Formula 1 from entering 2027 with the feeling that it has already lost control of its own regulations.
